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Cheats are a pervasive threat to public goods production in nat-
ural and human communities, as they benefit from the com-
mons without contributing to it. Although ecological antagonisms
such as predation, parasitism, competition, and abiotic environ-
mental stress play key roles in shaping population biology, it
is unknown how such stresses generally affect the ability of
cheats to undermine cooperation. We employed theory and ex-
periments to address this question in the pathogenic bacterium
Pseudomonas aeruginosa. Although public goods producers were
selected against in all populations, our competition experiments
showed that antibiotics significantly increased the advantage of
non-producers. Moreover, the dominance of non-producers in
mixed cultures was associated with higher resistance to antibiotics
than in either monoculture. Mathematical modeling indicates that
accentuated costs to cooperating phenotypes underlie the ob-
served patterns. Mathematical analysis further shows how these
patterns should generalize to other taxa with public goods behav-
iors. Our findings suggest that explaining the maintenance of co-
operative public goods behaviors in certain natural systemswill be
more challenging than previously thought. Our results also have
specific implications for the control of pathogenic bacteria using
antibiotics, and for understanding natural bacterial ecosystems,
where sub-inhibitory concentrations of antimicrobials frequently
occur.
cooperation j public goods j social behavior j siderophores j antibi-
otics
Introduction
Public goods production is a characteristic of a diverse range of
taxa, from microbes to humans (1–3). Explaining the persistence
of this costly behavior is challenging, since cheats can exploit the
commons without contributing. Kin selection theory has proven
to be a successful framework for addressing this question, with the
central prediction that cooperation is favored by sufficient bene-
fits to, and positive assortment between, cooperators (4–8). For
example, recent study in experimental bacterial populations has
elucidatedmechanisms such as assortment emerging from limited
or budding dispersal (9, 10) and kin discrimination (11, 12) that
are consistent with kin selection fostering cooperative behaviors
(e.g., (8, 13)). Yet despite this accumulating consensus, little is
known about how social populations respond to differences and
variation in abiotic and biotic components of their environment.
In particular, it is unclear how ecological antagonisms affect the
ability of cheats to invade cooperator communities.
It has been shown that cooperation can be affected by stress
directly through differential selection on cooperative phenotypes
(14, 15), or by inducing specific plastic behaviors (16–22), es-
pecially when cooperation leads to increased stress resistance.
However, in the absence of a direct benefit of the cooperative
behavior against stress, the ecological and evolutionary outcomes
of the interactions between non-defensive public goods and stress
responses are less clear, and are potentially complex. Cooperation
may be influenced indirectly through impacts on population struc-
ture and dynamics (23), via epistasis or pleiotropy (24), or through
the hitchhiking of cooperative genes with resistance mutations
(25–27). In the case of hitchhiking, the fate of cooperators might
in part be contingent on whether they represent the majority of
the population when the environmental stress occurs. This is be-
cause the probability of the emergence of resistance or tolerance
mutations should increase with population size (25, 28), and so
these mutations are most likely to appear in the more numer-
ous and/or most competitive subpopulation (i.e., with the fastest
growth). On the other hand, we would more generally expect
that, under sublethal stress, non-producers limit the emergence
and spread of resistant cooperators by cheating on public-goods
production. In addition, should stress responses (29–31) or the
evolution of stress resistance (32–34) entail costs, such costs could
potentially interact with social behaviors and accentuate selection
for cheating. Evidence to support or refute such hypotheses is
lacking. Addressing this gap crucially requires characterizing –
both experimentally and in general theoretical models – how the
fitness of cheats, relative to producers, depends on the level of
ecological stress.
Microbial populations are an increasing focus for research
on public goods dynamics (35–37). Microbes may exhibit rapid
ecological and evolutionary responses and are amenable to con-
trolled laboratory experimentation (36, 38). Bacteria, in partic-
ular, show a variety of behaviors consistent with basic social
interactions. These frequently involve the coordinated secretion
of metabolites that are potentially beneficial to others (i.e., public
goods), leading to, for example, collective motility and/or re-
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The evolution of cooperation is a central issue in biology
and the social sciences. Study on model systems of social
microbes has focused on how ‘cooperators’ and ‘cheats’ in-
teract, but rarely accounts for the surrounding environment.
We demonstrate how environmental stress in the form of
antibiotics alters the evolution of public goods cooperation in
a bacterium. Antibiotics accentuate the costs to cooperators,
resulting in their rapid demise relative to cheats. In a more
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Our work emphasizes eco-evolutionary feedbacks in social
evolution and demonstrates that social interactions may be
considerably modified in natural, stressful environments.
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Fig. 1. Experimental design and main experimental results. (A) Experimental design. (B) Change in non-producer frequencies in experimental populations
between beginning (T0) and end (T48) of the experiment. Panels correspond to different initial frequencies of non-producers. Colors represent gentamicin
doses. (C) Final frequency of resistant cells in producers (left) and non-producers (right) in monocultures (solid lines) and in mixed cultures (dashed lines) for
different doses of gentamicin. All bars are standard errors of the mean.
Fig. 2. Results of a general mathematical model. (A) The level of an
ecological antagonism and the relative fitness of public goods non-producers
can be related in four qualitatively different ways: S1, S2, S3 or S4. (B) For
an antagonism that induces mortality, the form of the relationship depends
on kPS / kQS (the ratio of the effects of the antagonism on producers and
non-producers, respectively, as the antagonism level approaches infinity)
and MQS / MPS (the ratio of the antagonism levels at which the antagonism
effect is half its maximum for non-producers and producers, respectively)
raised to the power of h (a constant, typically between 1 and 10). (C) For an
antagonism that slows growth or reproduction, the class of the relationship
also depends on the cost of public goods production, c. Boundaries defining
the parameter regions of S1-S4 are shown as solid lines. Assuming the
antagonism affects producers at least as much as non-producers excludes
the unshaded regions of the parameter space below and to the left of the
dashed lines in each panel. Thus for an antagonism that induces mortality,
only relationships S1 and S2 are possible, whereas for an antagonism that
slows growth or reproduction when c > 0, all four classes of relationship are
possible (in the figure we set c = 0.31, which is the estimate obtained from
our data). Our experimental system lies within the S1 region, as indicated by
the cross labeled “fitted parameters”.
source acquisition (reviewed by e.g., (35, 39, 40)). Bacteria are
confronted with a variety of antagonisms, including predation
and parasitism (e.g., phages, metazoans, plasmids), antimicro-
bials produced by other organisms (antibiotics, AMPs, toxins),
and abiotic environments (extreme temperatures, pH, salinity)
that can result in reduced fitness through decreases in survival
and reproduction. In particular, subinhibitory concentrations of
antimicrobials are pervasive in natural environments such as
rivers, lakes, soils, and bacterial hosts (animals and plants). In
human society, subinhibitory levels of anthropogenic antibiotics
are important for their impacts on managed systems (e.g., an-
imal husbandry), their effects as environmental pollutants, and
their key role in the progressive increases in antibiotic resistance
(41–43). Subinhibitory concentrations have been shown to affect
cellular physiology, and genetic variability and behaviors, yet the
evolutionary implications are largely unknown (41).
We used a bacterial system to test the prediction that the
direct cost of public goods production and indirect costs through
exploitation by non-producers accentuate both the ecological and
evolutionary benefits of cheating when the population faces an
environmental stress. Specifically, we examined how a public
goods trait in the form of siderophore production interacts with
resistance evolution to the antibiotic gentamicin in the pathogenic
bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We grew a strain of P. aerug-
inosa PAO1 producing the siderophore pyoverdin and/or a non-
producing strain under iron-limited conditions with different
doses of the antibiotic. Siderophores are small secretedmolecules
that chelate poorly-soluble iron in the environment, making the
iron available to bacteria via specific outer-membrane receptors
(44). Because any cell carrying these receptors can use chelated
iron, siderophores are a public good in well-mixed environments.
As such, costly siderophore production is vulnerable to ‘cheating’
by cells that do not produce the molecule, but possess specialized
receptors and reap the benefit of available iron (e.g., (13, 45)).
We employed subinhibitory antibiotic concentrations, which the
bacteria are most likely to encounter in natural settings and in
host tissues (46–49). We assessed (i) the impact of antibiotic
pressure on the interaction between the two production geno-
types and (ii) the consequences for the population response to
antibiotics, in particular the evolution of resistance. We found
that antibiotic stress accelerates the decline of producers inmixed
cultures, indicating that the environment can shape competitive
interactions. Moreover, non-producer resistance frequency was
greater in mixed cultures compared to monocultures of either
non-producers or producers. A mathematical model shows that
these observed qualitative patterns may be explained by the
constitutive investment in pyoverdin production decreasing the
capacity of producers to cope with antibiotic stress in the presence
of non-producers. Given the generality of the model, its predic-
tions regarding the interplay between social and stress resistance
traits should apply to many other biological systems. We discuss
these findings in the contexts of social evolution and resistance to
antagonisms, with a focus on bacterial evolution.
Experimental results
1. Changes in non-producer frequency
In all mixed populations, for all three initial frequencies and
four antibiotic treatments (Fig. 1A), non-producer frequency
increased over the course of the experiment (Fig. 1B). Non-
producer frequencies were substantially higher in the presence of
the antibiotic than in the antibiotic-free controls. At higher doses
(4 and 8 µg/mL), non-producers had often reached near-fixation
(> 90%) after 48 hours.
Antibiotic dose further affected the timing of changes in the
relative frequencies of producers and non-producers, as indicated
by the significant time × gentamicin interaction (χ23 = 123.39, p
< 0.0001). Namely, at the two lower doses (2 and 4 µg/mL), non-
producer frequencies increased considerably during the first 24
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Fig. 3. Results of the mathematical model fitted to
the experimental data. (A) Change in non-producer
frequencies in a mathematical model between T0 and
T48. Panels correspond to different initial frequencies
of non-producers. Colors represent gentamicin doses.
(B) Resistance frequencies in a mathematical model
at T48. Final frequency of resistant cells in producers
(left) and non-producers (right) in monocultures (solid
lines) and in mixed cultures (dashed lines) for differ-
ent doses of gentamicin. See SI Appendix for model
definition and parameter values.
hours and then reached a peak (Fig. 1B). At the highest antibiotic
dose (8 µg/mL), this increase was delayed by c 24h.
These patterns were similar for all initial frequencies of
non-producers, and the significant three-way interaction (time
× gentamicin × initial frequency, χ26 = 26.69, p < 0.001) likely
reflects the lower absolute change in frequency for populations
initiated with 75% of non-producers (since frequencies cannot
exceed 100%).
2. Effects of the antibiotic and initial non-producer frequency on
bacterial antibiotic resistance
Experimental treatments affected resistance frequencies in
three main ways. First, increasing the dose of gentamicin led to
higher frequencies of resistant cells, with up to a five-order-of-
magnitude difference between the highest dose (8 µg/mL) and the
control (Fig. 1C). Nonetheless, the frequency of resistance always
remained below 10%.
Second, producer monocultures generally showed higher fre-
quencies of resistance than non-producer monocultures at all
three gentamicin doses (producer vs. non-producer: χ21 = 9.0, p
= 0.0027; Fig. 1C). Third, resistance was more frequent in mixed
culture than in monoculture, in particular at high antibiotic dose
(Fig. 1C). This general pattern held for both producers (mono vs.
mixed: χ21 = 43.7, p < 0.0001) and non-producers (χ21 = 34.2,
p < 0.0001), despite some deviations (significant dose × initial
non-producer frequency interactions for both producer types:
χ29 > 16, p < 0.05). Namely, for producers, the higher mixed-
culture resistance was only consistently prominent in lines from
the highest antibiotic dose treatment (Fig. 1C, left panel). Non-
producers showed higher mixed-culture resistance over all dose
treatments, but there was more variation among lines with dif-
ferent initial non-producer frequencies (Fig. 1C, right panel). A
supplementary replicate experiment confirmed thesemain results
(Supplementary Fig. 3E-G).
The unexpected observation of higher frequencies of pro-
ducer resistance in mixed culture led us to conduct a series of
additional assays (SI Appendix) to investigate in more detail
the quantitative levels of resistance (measured as the minimum
inhibitory concentration) and associated fitness costs in mixed
and monocultures. Our hypothesis was that producers in mixed
culture might have acquired particular adaptations to selection
pressures from both non-producers and the antibiotic, resulting
in highly resistant, fit producers that could coexist with non-
producers. Indeed, we found that, unlike non-producers, produc-
ers tended to be more resistant (higher level of resistance) in
mixed cultures compared to monocultures (p< 0.05, Supplemen-
tary Fig. 4A-C). Moreover, this higher level of resistance did not
come at an increased fitness cost: resistant producers showed an
average reduction of growth of 40%, both in monocultures and
mixed cultures, compared to non-resistant producers (ANOVA,
F1,41 = 116.232, p < 0.001; Supplementary Fig. 4D-F). Based on
the growth assays, the availability and production of pyoverdin
were higher in resistant producers compared to non-resistant
producers (availability: ANOVA, F1,9 = 21.603, p < 0.005; pro-
duction: ANOVA, F1,9 = 69.362, p< 0.001). However, we did not
detect significant differences in pyoverdin availability (ANOVA,
F1,9 = 0.069, p = 0.799; Supplementary Fig. 5A) nor production
per cell (ANOVA, F1,9 = 1.252, p = 0.292; Supplementary Fig.
5B-D) between resistant colonies from mixed cultures and from
monocultures. This suggests that competition with non-producers
did not select for decreased pyoverdin production in resistant
producers.
We then investigated genetic resistance to gentamicin in re-
sistant and non-resistant individual colonies of producers and
non-producers from all treatments in the repeated 48-hour ex-
periment (SI Appendix). We sequenced the repressor gene and
intergenic region of the efflux pump MexXY, described as the
only identified pump mediating aminoglycoside resistance (50,
51). While the observed selection for resistant phenotypes sug-
gests an underlying genetic component, we did not detect any ev-
idence of gene modification in these markers (SI Appendix). We
further tested for the presence of 9 genes coding for gentamicin-
degrading enzymes and did not detect any of these genes.
Theoretical framework
Our experimental results showed that (i) antibiotics increased
the frequency of non-producers in mixed cultures in a dose-
dependent manner and (ii) the frequency of resistant cells was
higher in mixed cultures than in either monoculture. We hy-
pothesized that the cost of public goods production reduced the
capacity of producers to cope with antibiotic stress, perhaps by
depleting metabolic resources that would otherwise be expended
on countering the drug’s effects. This would be especially pro-
nounced in the presence of non-producers since the latter con-
stitute an indirect cost by removing iron from the environment.
We developed and analyzed a mathematical model to examine
this hypothesis and to investigate more generally how an ecolog-
ical antagonism can influence competition between public goods
producers and non-producers.
1. Effects of an ecological antagonism on interactions between
producers and non-producers
In analyzing the effects of an ecological antagonism, we
are primarily interested in how rapidly the frequency of non-
producers increases during the exponential growth phase, when
population size and public goods concentration are both relatively
small. We therefore assume that the latter two factors have rela-
tively little effect on the frequency dynamics and can be neglected.
We further assume that the cost of public goods production is
approximately constant. For an antagonism that slows growth or
reproduction, the dynamical equations are then
where NPS and NQS are the numbers of producers and non-
producers (respectively), b is the baseline birth rate, c is the cost
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of public goods production, and εPS ≤ 1 and εQS ≤ 1 are the
effects of the antagonism. The equations for a mortality-inducing
antagonism are similar (SIAppendix).We assume the antagonism
dose-response curve can be approximated by a sigmoidal Hill
function kAh/(Ah + Mh), where A is the level of the antagonism,
and k, h and M are constant parameters. The Hill function form
accords, for example, with the pharmacodynamics of antibiotics
including gentamicin (52–54).
Analysis of our mathematical model reveals that, in general,
the relative fitness of non-producers can vary with the antagonism
level in four qualitatively different ways. The type of relationship
(monotonically increasing, monotonically decreasing, peaked, or
valley shaped) depends on the relative sizes of the antagonism
effects and the cost of public goods production (Fig. 2, SI Ap-
pendix).
Non-producer frequency is expected to increase fastest at
intermediate antagonism levels (as in our experimental system)
if the antagonism (i) affects producers more than non-producers
at low and intermediate levels, but (ii) impacts both populations
similarly at very high levels. This pattern holds over a wide
range of plausible parameter values, regardless of whether the
antagonism affects growth, reproduction or mortality, and is not
sensitive to public goods dynamics (SI Appendix).
To further quantify antibiotic effects in our experimental
system, we extended our mathematical odel, such that the
fitness of each subpopulation depended on the cost of public
goods production, the population density, the beneficial effect
of public goods, and effects of the antibiotic on bacterial growth.
We then tailored this model to our particular biological system by
specifying functional forms for each component (SI Appendix).
When fitted to the bacterial population data using aMarkov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) method (SI Appendix), the dynamical
model provides a good statistical fit to the experimental data
(Supplementary Fig. 7) and shows frequency dynamics qualita-
tively consistent with experimental observations (Fig. 3A). Ini-
tially, non-producer frequency increases fastest at intermediate
antibiotic concentrations, and increases slowest at high antibiotic
concentrations. However, under the reasonable assumption that
the antibiotic effect decreases over time (which could occur, for
example, due to drug degradation (55) or bacterial adaptation
(56)), the model predicts that the rate of change will accelerate
in the latter case, as we indeed observed in our experiments.
2. Effects of non-producer frequency on resistance to an ecolog-
ical antagonism
We next investigated the effects of the initial frequency of
public goods non-producers (and the antagonism level) on the
frequency of resistance to an ecological antagonism, by extending
the previously described mathematical model to include resistant
and susceptible subpopulations of producers and non-producers.
To ensure generality, we analyzed various alternative ways in
which the public goods concentration, the antagonism level, and
the cost of resistance to the antagonism might affect the relative
fitness of the resistant subpopulation (SI Appendix). This analysis
reveals that, when the antagonism level is relatively high, a public
good (such as pyoverdin) will increase the final frequency of
resistance to the antagonism only if (i) the beneficial effect of
the public good interacts with the effect of the antagonism or
with the cost of resistance (or both); and (ii) the primary effect
of the antagonism is to slow growth or reproduction. When these
conditions are met, the beneficial effects of the public good
accentuate the fitness difference that results from the unequal
effects of the antagonism on susceptible and resistant bacteria.
According to the fitted model described previously (SI Ap-
pendix, Supplementary Fig. 7), pyoverdin’s effect on the final
frequency of resistance increased with antibiotic dose, within the
range tested in our experiments (Fig. 3B). The model output re-
sembles the data for the frequency of resistance in non-producers,
but is less accurate for the frequency of resistance in producers.
An examination of the data (Supplementary Fig. 7) suggests that
this discrepancy is a result of the rapid decrease in the susceptible
producer population towards the end of the experiment, which
may have been due to environmental deterioration (not included
in the mathematical model).
Discussion
Social behaviors are widespread across the living world at all
organizational levels (57). While underlying intrapopulation in-
teractions have been extensively studied, their interplay with en-
vironmental factors is only beginning to be understood. Crucially,
very little is known about how ecological antagonisms affect
the risk that cheating will undermine cooperation, particularly
when cooperation is not directly involved in resistance or tol-
erance. Here, we focused on the interplay between antibiotic
stress and siderophore cooperation in P. aeruginosa. We found
that antibiotics constitute a cost to social behaviors, manifested
by an increased benefit of cheating under stressful conditions.
Mathematical analyses show the key driver to be the differential
stress sensitivities of the two public goods strategies. Our exper-
imental and theoretical results thus contribute to disentangling
the complex ecological and evolutionary dynamics of public goods
behaviors and their interactions with biological stressors such
as antibiotics. Our mathematical model is sufficiently general
for its testable predictions to apply to public goods cooperation
across a wide array of biological systems. Below we discuss the
importance of ecological antagonisms in the evolution of public
goods behaviors and resistance.
The essential element underlying all of our results is that,
while public goods benefit every individual, only producers pay
the associated fitness cost. This factor can explain why producer
bacteria were more affected than non-producers by antibiotic
stress: the fitness cost of pyoverdin production (58) limited the
capacity of producers to resist antibiotics (which is also associated
with a metabolic fitness cost; Supplementary Fig. 4D-F, (59)) and
to compete with non-producers. In other words, in the absence of
a ‘private benefit’ to producers, it is growth in the absence of stress
that, all else being equal, determines how well a strain can cope
with an ecological antagonism. This is consistent with the findings
of Mitri and collaborators (60) who employed computer simu-
lations in a spatial setting and showed that antagonism (in this
case ecological competition) is more detrimental to cooperators
than to cheats when nutrients are limiting. The authors suggested
that this effect is due to the investment in cooperative secretions
limiting growth and thereby competitive ability. Alternatively,
in some particular cases, antagonisms may directly increase the
benefit to non-producers by inducing the production of costly
public goods (20, 61). In Staphylococcus aureus, for example, sub-
lethal doses of ciprofloxacin, mupirocin, or rifampicin induce the
expression of the costly effector molecule regulating the quorum-
sensing system agr, thereby favoring agr-negative variants (61).
Such findings add to the challenge of explaining how coopera-
tors and cheats coexist in nature. Our results specifically imply
that cooperation may be even costlier in natural social bacterial
systems than suggested by previous study (e.g., (13). In many
cases, a likely important factor enabling coexistence is spatial
structure (62–64), whereby spatial segregation of non-producers
and producers limits the exploitative potential of the former.
In one of the few studies investigating interactions between
antibiotics and social behaviors in bacteria, Diard and colleagues
(14) assessed the in vivo impact of ciprofloxacin on competi-
tion between virulent cooperative Salmonella enterica serovar
Typhimurium and avirulent defectors. In the absence of the an-
tibiotic, defectors outcompeted cooperators in the gut lumen,
whereas the antibiotic addition reversed the outcome, leading to
selection for the virulent cooperators. Indeed, only the virulent
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cells were able to invade host tissues and escape antibiotic mortal-
ity in the lumen. The authors observed that, when antibiotic pres-
sure decreased, the virulent strain reinvaded the gut lumen. Our
results contrast with these findings of Diard and coworkers, as
we observed that antibiotics led to the selection of non-producers
over producers.We hypothesize that this is because of differences
in spatial structure between the two studies: whereas the gut
lumen is a highly structured environment, our in vitro studies
were conducted under well-mixed conditions, where producers
had no refuge from the antibiotic, nor from exploitation by non-
producers.
Whereas public goods availability had relatively little effect
on non-producer frequency dynamics, we found it had a major
role in the evolution of resistance to an ecological antagonism.
Purely producer populations should have the highest public goods
availability per individual, leading to the highest growth rates
and population sizes, and therefore one might expect to see the
highest final frequency of resistance in the absence of cheats.
However, in our experiments we found that, under the highest an-
tibiotic dose, the frequency of resistant cells was higher in mixed
cultures. Our mathematical model shows that this pattern is
predicted when a bacteriostatic antibiotic affects producers more
than non-producers, provided the beneficial effect of the public
good interacts with the effects of the drug (SI Appendix). This can
explain why resistant non-producers grew faster inmixed cultures,
not only compared to resistant non-producers in monoculture,
but also compared to resistant producers in monoculture, thereby
leading to more resistance in mixed populations. The optimal
frequency for non-producers appears to be low. When initially
very frequent (75%), non-producers did not evolve substantially
higher frequencies of resistance compared to their populations
in monoculture, possibly as uncommon producers yielded low
pyoverdin concentration thereby contributing relatively little both
to non-producer growth (20) and to the generation of resistant
variants. An additional experiment (SI Appendix) confirmed that
differences in growth and antibiotic resistance between producers
and non-producers are mediated by pyoverdin availability and
production: when populations grew under high iron availability
conditions (i.e., where siderophores are not needed), the non-
producers did not invade the mixed populations (Supplementary
Fig. 6A) and the frequency of resistance was similar for both
strains in mixed cultures and in both monocultures (Supplemen-
tary Fig. 6E-G). Ourmathematical model also predicts that, when
iron availability is limited, resistance among producers will be
more frequent in monocultures than in mixed cultures, yet ex-
perimentally we observed the opposite pattern. This discrepancy
between theory and experiments may be explained by the steep
decline in sensitive producer densities near the end of the culture
period, as they succumbed to the combined effects of antibiotics
and exploitation by cheats.
Our results have implications for the control of pathogenic
bacteria using antibiotics, and especially for the treatment of
multiple versus single strain infections, as we have found that
antibiotics can select for an overall higher prevalence of resis-
tance when both producers and non-producers are present. It
has previously been shown that selection for non-producers is
expected to lower bacterial virulence (65, 66). We observed that
highly resistant producers also arose in mixed cultures, but they
were outcompeted by resistant non-producers. This could have
implications for predicting the direct and knock-on effects of
antibiotic dosing on treatment outcomes (see e.g., discussion in
(67)).
Our findings also provide insights into competitive interac-
tions in natural ecosystems. In particular, our study addresses
two of the “outstanding questions” in a recent review by Ghoul
and Mitri (68): how does the environment dictate the prevalence
of competition, and is it possible to manipulate competition
by altering environmental conditions? We have shown that the
prevalence and outcomes of competition may be highly depen-
dent on the environment, so that it is possible to manipulate the
relative fitness of the competitors by modifying their environ-
ment. Indeed, increased iron availability resulted in the higher
relative fitness of producers. Moreover, the dose of antibiotics
in the environment shapes the outcomes of competition between
producers and non-producers, with intermediate doses increasing
the advantage to non-producers.
Previous research has propounded the importance of ecology
in social evolution and called for a deeper integration of eco-
logical factors in social theory (69–73). Further to this claim, we
suggest that ecological stressors could impact social evolution in
microbes and in multicellular taxa more generally. Testing this
broader hypothesis would require extensions of ourmathematical
model and experiments to assess the costs and payoffs of different
social strategies in a wider range of environments with various
types of spatial structure.
Materials and Methods
Experiment
Experimental protocol
We used P. aeruginosa PAO1 as the pyoverdin producing wild type
(‘producers’) and an otherwise isogenic mutant PAO1ΔpvdD (74) unable
to produce pyoverdin (‘non-producers’). We inoculated bacteria as either
monocultures or mixed cultures of producers and non-producers to a final
density of c 107 bacteria per mL into fresh iron-limited medium with either a
low (2 µg/mL), intermediate (4 µg/mL), or high (8 µg/mL) dose of gentamicin,
or in antibiotic-free medium (Fig. 1A). Mixed populations were initiated with
15%, or 45%, or 75% of non-producers. Each treatment was replicated 5
times for a total of 100 populations (4 antibiotic conditions × 5 types of
cultures × 5 replicates) that were arbitrarily distributed in the 48-well plates.
The experiment was run for 48 hours at 37°C under constant shaking (350
rpm, 8 mm stroke). We measured the densities and the relative frequencies
of producers and non-producers by plating samples of each population onto
King’s Bmedium (KB) agar plates and subsequent counting of colony forming
units (CFUs) at the beginning of the experiment (T0) and after 10 (T10), 24
(T24), 34 (T34) and 48 (T48) hours. In addition, we estimated the frequency
of resistant cells at T0 and T48 by plating samples of each population onto
antibiotic-free KB agar plates and onto KB agar with 10 µg/mL gentamicin,
simultaneously. Experimental conditions are detailed in the Section 1 of the
SI Appendix.
Additional assays
Following the above described experiment, we conducted a series of
assays detailed in Sections 2 and 3 of the SI Appendix. Briefly, we repeated
the experiment for a subset of treatments and we isolated resistant and non-
resistant clones from the ancestral and all of the evolved populations. We
subsequently assayed pyoverdin production, the growth capacity and the
level of gentamicin resistance of these clones. We explored the genetic basis
of gentamicin resistance in the clones by target-sequencing and sequence
amplification. Moreover, we controlled for the importance of pyoverdin
cooperation in the observed dynamics by growing producers and non-
producers under iron-rich conditions (i.e., that did not require siderophore
production).
Mathematical analysis and modeling
We conducted a general mathematical analysis of the relative fitness
of public goods producer and non-producer subpopulations, and of sub-
populations resistant and susceptible to an ecological antagonism. The
main assumptions are that public goods production and resistance to the
antagonism incur fitness costs, and the antagonismmay affect producers and
non-producers unequally. The full analysis can be found in SI Appendix.
We also developed a more specific mathematical model of our experi-
mental system as a quantitative test of our assumptions. We fitted this model
to the bacterial population data using a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
method (75, 76) and verified the fit with a different algorithm (77). Further
details of the model are in SI Appendix.
Acknowledgements
We thank Pierre Cornelis and Melanie Ghoul for providing the PAO1
and PAO1ΔpvdD strains of P. aeruginosa; David Lunn for helping us acquire
and set up software; and Guillaume Martin, Sylvain Gandon, Sonia Kéfi,
Sébastien Lion, Sara Mitri and Rolf Kümmerli for helpful advice. This work
was supported by James S. McDonnell Foundation Studying Complex Systems
Research Award No. 220020294 (to M.E.H.) and a doctoral grant from the
French Ministry of Research (to M.V).
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
Footline Author PNAS Issue Date Volume Issue Number 5
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
Submission PDF
1. West SA, Griffin AS, Gardner A, Diggle SP (2006) Social evolution theory for microorgan-
isms. Nat Rev Microbiol 4(8):597–607.
2. Rankin DJ, BargumK, KokkoH (2007) The tragedy of the commons in evolutionary biology.
Trends Ecol Evol 22(12):643–651.
3. Cordero OX, Ventouras L-A, DeLong EF, Polz MF (2012) Public good dynamics drive
evolution of iron acquisition strategies in natural bacterioplankton populations. Proc Natl
Acad Sci 109(49):20059–20064.
4. Bourke AFG (2011) The validity and value of inclusive fitness theory. Proc R Soc Lond B Biol
Sci 278(1723):3313–3320.
5. Fletcher JA,DoebeliM (2009)A simple and general explanation for the evolution of altruism.
Proc R Soc B Biol Sci 276(1654):13–19.
6. Hamilton WD (1964) The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I. J Theor Biol 7(1):1–16.
7. HamiltonWD (1964) The genetical evolution of social behaviour. II. J Theor Biol 7(1):17–52.
8. West SA, Pen I, Griffin AS (2002) Cooperation and Competition Between Relatives. Science
296(5565):72–75.
9. Gardner A, West SA (2006) Demography, altruism, and the benefits of budding. J Evol Biol
19(5):1707–1716.
10. Kümmerli R, Gardner A, West SA, Griffin AS (2009) Limited Dispersal, Budding Dispersal,
and Cooperation: An Experimental Study. Evolution 63(4):939–949.
11. Mehdiabadi NJ, et al. (2006) Social evolution: Kin preference in a social microbe. Nature
442(7105):881–882.
12. Rendueles O, et al. (2015) Rapid and widespread de novo evolution of kin discrimination.
Proc Natl Acad Sci 112(29):9076–9081.
13. Griffin AS,West SA, Buckling A (2004) Cooperation and competition in pathogenic bacteria.
Nature 430(7003):1024–1027.
14. Diard M, et al. (2014) Antibiotic Treatment Selects for Cooperative Virulence of Salmonella
Typhimurium. Curr Biol 24(17):2000–2005.
15. Friman V-P, Diggle SP, Buckling A (2013) Protist predation can favour cooperation within
bacterial species. Biol Lett 9(5):20130548.
16. Bleich R,Watrous JD, Dorrestein PC, Bowers AA, Shank EA (2015) Thiopeptide antibiotics
stimulate biofilm formation in Bacillus subtilis. Proc Natl Acad Sci 112(10):3086–3091.
17. Finkelshtein A, Roth D, Jacob EB, Ingham CJ (2015) Bacterial Swarms Recruit Cargo
Bacteria To Pave the Way in Toxic Environments. mBio 6(3):e00074–15.
18. Hoffman LR, et al. (2005) Aminoglycoside antibiotics induce bacterial biofilm formation.
Nature 436(7054):1171–1175.
19. Kaplan JB, et al. (2012) Low Levels of β-Lactam Antibiotics Induce Extracellular DNA
Release and Biofilm Formation in Staphylococcus aureus. mBio 3(4):e00198–12.
20. Vasse M, Torres-Barceló C, Hochberg ME (2015) Phage selection for bacterial cheats leads
to population decline. Proc R Soc B 282(1818):20152207.
21. Oliveira NM, et al. (2015) Biofilm Formation As a Response to Ecological Competition.
PLoS Biol 13(7):e1002191.
22. Boyle KE, Monaco H, van Ditmarsch D, Deforet M, Xavier JB (2015) Integration of
Metabolic and Quorum Sensing Signals Governing the Decision to Cooperate in a Bacterial
Social Trait. PLoS Comput Biol 11(5):e1004279.
23. Ben-Jacob E, et al. (2000) Bacterial cooperative organization under antibiotic stress. Phys
Stat Mech Its Appl 282(1–2):247–282.
24. Yurtsev EA, Chao HX, Datta MS, Artemova T, Gore J (2013) Bacterial cheating drives the
population dynamics of cooperative antibiotic resistance plasmids.Mol Syst Biol 9(1):683.
25. Morgan AD, Quigley BJZ, Brown SP, Buckling A (2012) Selection on non-social traits limits
the invasion of social cheats. Ecol Lett 15(8):841–846.
26. Quigley BJZ, López DG, Buckling A, McKane AJ, Brown SP (2012) The mode of
host–parasite interaction shapes coevolutionary dynamics and the fate of host cooperation.
Proc R Soc B Biol Sci 279(1743):3742–3748.
27. Waite AJ, Shou W (2012) Adaptation to a new environment allows cooperators to purge
cheaters stochastically. Proc Natl Acad Sci 109(47):19079–19086.
28. Ramsayer J, Kaltz O, Hochberg ME (2013) Evolutionary rescue in populations of Pseu-
domonas fluorescens across an antibiotic gradient. Evol Appl 6(4):608–616.
29. Baharoglu Z, Mazel D (2014) SOS, the formidable strategy of bacteria against aggressions.
FEMS Microbiol Rev 38(6):1126–1145.
30. Poole K (2012) Bacterial stress responses as determinants of antimicrobial resistance. J
Antimicrob Chemother 67(9):2069–2089.
31. Schimel J, Balser TC, Wallenstein M (2007) Microbial stress-response physiology and its
implications for ecosystem function. Ecology 88(6):1386–1394.
32. Koskella B, Lin DM, Buckling A, Thompson JN (2012) The costs of evolving resistance in
heterogeneous parasite environments. Proc R Soc B Biol Sci 279(1735):1896–1903.
33. Martínez JL, Rojo F (2011) Metabolic regulation of antibiotic resistance. FEMS Microbiol
Rev 35(5):768–789.
34. Melnyk AH, Wong A, Kassen R (2015) The fitness costs of antibiotic resistance mutations.
Evol Appl 8(3):273–283.
35. Crespi BJ (2001) The evolution of social behavior in microorganisms. Trends Ecol Evol
16(4):178–183.
36. West SA, Diggle SP, Buckling A, Gardner A, Griffin AS (2007) The Social Lives of Microbes.
Annu Rev Ecol Evol Syst 38(1):53–77.
37. Xavier JB (2011) Social interaction in synthetic and natural microbial communities.Mol Syst
Biol 7(1):483.
38. Strassmann JE, Queller DC (2011) Evolution of cooperation and control of cheating in a
social microbe. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 108 Suppl 2:10855–10862.
39. Celiker H, Gore J (2013) Cellular cooperation: insights from microbes. Trends Cell Biol
23(1):9–15.
40. Velicer GJ (2003) Social strife in the microbial world. Trends Microbiol 11(7):330–337.
41. Andersson DI, Hughes D (2014)Microbiological effects of sublethal levels of antibiotics.Nat
Rev Microbiol 12(7):465–478.
42. Baquero F (2008) Antibiotics and antibiotic resistance in water environments. Curr Opin
Biotechnol 19:260–265.
43. Gullberg E, et al. (2011) Selection of Resistant Bacteria at Very Low Antibiotic Concentra-
tions. PLOS Pathog 7(7):e1002158.
44. HannauerM, et al. (2012) The PvdRT-OpmQefflux pump controls themetal selectivity of the
iron uptake pathway mediated by the siderophore pyoverdine in Pseudomonas aeruginosa.
Environ Microbiol 14(7):1696–1708.
45. West SA, Buckling A (2003) Cooperation, virulence and siderophore production in bacterial
parasites. Proc R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 270(1510):37–44.
46. Jauri PV, Bakker MG, Salomon CE, Kinkel LL (2013) Subinhibitory Antibiotic Concen-
trations Mediate Nutrient Use and Competition among Soil Streptomyces. PLOS ONE
8(12):e81064.
47. Khan GA, Berglund B, Khan KM, Lindgren P-E, Fick J (2013) Occurrence and Abundance
of Antibiotics and Resistance Genes in Rivers, Canal and near Drug Formulation Facilities
– A Study in Pakistan. PLOS ONE 8(6):e62712.
48. Rice LB (2013) The Complex Dynamics of Antimicrobial Activity in the Human Gastroin-
testinal Tract. Trans Am Clin Climatol Assoc 124:123–132.
49. Sukul P, Spiteller M (2007) Fluoroquinolone Antibiotics in the Environment. Reviews of
Environmental Contamination and Toxicology, Reviews of Environmental Contamination and
Toxicology. (Springer New York), pp 131–162.
50. Poole K (2011) Pseudomonas Aeruginosa: Resistance to the Max. Front Microbiol 2. doi:1-
0.3389/fmicb.2011.00065.
51. Morita Y, Tomida J, Kawamura Y (2012) MexXY multidrug efflux system of Pseudomonas
aeruginosa. Front Microbiol 3. doi:10.3389/fmicb.2012.00408.
52. Tam VH, Kabbara S, Vo G, Schilling AN, Coyle EA (2006) Comparative Pharmacodynamics
of Gentamicin against Staphylococcus aureus and Pseudomonas aeruginosa. Antimicrob
Agents Chemother 50(8):2626–2631.
53. Regoes RR, et al. (2004) Pharmacodynamic Functions: a Multiparameter Approach to the
Design of Antibiotic Treatment Regimens. Antimicrob Agents Chemother 48(10):3670–3676.
54. Udekwu KI, Parrish N, Ankomah P, Baquero F, Levin BR (2009) Functional relation-
ship between bacterial cell density and the efficacy of antibiotics. J Antimicrob Chemother
63(4):745–757.
55. Ramirez MS, Tolmasky ME (2010) Aminoglycoside Modifying Enzymes. Drug Resist Updat
Rev Comment Antimicrob Anticancer Chemother 13(6):151–171.
56. Garneau-Tsodikova S, Labby KJ (2016) Mechanisms of resistance to aminoglycoside antibi-
otics: overview and perspectives.Med Chem Commun (7):11–27.
57. West SA, Griffin AS, Gardner A (2007) Evolutionary Explanations for Cooperation. Curr
Biol 17(16):R661–R672.
58. Dumas Z, Kümmerli R (2012) Cost of cooperation rules selection for cheats in bacterial
metapopulations. J Evol Biol 25(3):473–484.
59. Andersson DI, Levin BR (1999) The biological cost of antibiotic resistance. Curr Opin
Microbiol 2(5):489–493.
60. Mitri S, Xavier JB, Foster KR (2011) Social evolution inmultispecies biofilms. Proc Natl Acad
Sci 108(Supplement 2):10839–10846.
61. Paulander W, et al. (2012) Antibiotic-Mediated Selection of Quorum-Sensing-Negative
Staphylococcus aureus. mBio 3(6):e00459–12.
62. Allen B, Gore J, Nowak MA (2013) Spatial dilemmas of diffusible public goods. eLife
2:e01169.
63. Kümmerli R, Schiessl KT, Waldvogel T, McNeill K, Ackermann M (2014) Habitat structure
and the evolution of diffusible siderophores in bacteria. Ecol Lett 17(12):1536–1544.
64. Moreno-Fenoll C, Cavaliere M, Martinez-Garcia E, Poyatos JF (2016) Exploitation by
cheaters facilitates the preservation of essential public goods in microbial communities.
bioRxiv. doi:10.1101/040964.
65. Buckling A, et al. (2007) Siderophore-mediated cooperation and virulence in Pseudomonas
aeruginosa. FEMS Microbiol Ecol 62(2):135–141.
66. Kirienko NV, Ausubel FM, Ruvkun G (2015) Mitophagy confers resistance to siderophore-
mediated killing by Pseudomonas aeruginosa. Proc Natl Acad Sci 112(6):1821–1826.
67. Day T, ReadAF (2016)DoesHigh-DoseAntimicrobial Chemotherapy Prevent the Evolution
of Resistance? PLOS Comput Biol 12(1):e1004689.
68. Ghoul M, Mitri S (2016) The Ecology and Evolution of Microbial Competition. Trends
Microbiol 24(10):833–845.
69. Brockhurst MA, Habets MGJL, Libberton B, Buckling A, Gardner A (2010) Ecological
drivers of the evolution of public-goods cooperation in bacteria. Ecology 91(2):334–340.
70. Korb J, Foster KR (2010) Ecological competition favours cooperation in termite societies.
Ecol Lett 13(6):754–760.
71. Korb J, Heinze J (2008) Ecology of Social Evolution (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin,
Heidelberg) Available at: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-540-75957-7.
72. Rubenstein DR (2011) Spatiotemporal environmental variation, risk aversion, and the
evolution of cooperative breeding as a bet-hedging strategy. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 108
Suppl 2:10816–10822.
73. Shen S-F, et al. (2012)Unfavourable environment limits social conflict inYuhina brunneiceps.
Nat Commun 3:885.
74. Ghysels B, et al. (2004) FpvB, an alternative type I ferripyoverdine receptor of Pseudomonas
aeruginosa.Microbiology 150(6):1671–1680.
75. Lunn, D.J., Thomas, A., Best, N., Spiegelhalter, D. (2000)WinBUGS -- a Bayesianmodelling
framework: concepts, structure, and extensibility. Stat Comput 10:325–337.
76. Lunn, D.J. (2004) WinBUGS differential interface—worked examples (Department of Epi-
demiology and Public Health, Imperial College School of Medicine, London).
77. Soetaert K, Petzoldt T (2010) Inverse Modelling, Sensitivity and Monte Carlo Analysis in R
Using Package FME. J Stat Softw 33(3). doi:10.18637/jss.v033.i03.
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
6 www.pnas.org --- --- Footline Author
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
Please review all the figures in this paginated PDF and check if the
      figure size is appropriate to allow reading of the text in the figure.
      If readability needs to be improved then resize the figure again in
      'Figure sizing' interface of Article Sizing Tool.
